The inherent jurisdiction and coercive control

What is the inherent jurisdiciton?

The inherent jurisdiction is a power of the High Court to protect adults who are at risk, even though they have mental capacity. It is separate from the Court of Protection, which makes decisions for people who lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (for info on this, see the page on Mental capacity law).

The High Court can step in where a person’s ability to make a free decision has been undermined by coercion, undue influence or fear. The law treats such a person as someone whose decision-making has been disabled, not as someone who lacks capacity.

A local authority will usually make the application. The court can make orders such as injunctions against the controlling person, or allow the vulnerable adult to be seen alone, assessed or supported somewhere safe. The aim is not to override the person’s choices, but to create space and time so that they can make decisions free from pressure. Orders are meant to be proportionate and temporary.

Inherent jurisdiction cases about coercive control

Amina Al-Jeffery v Mohammed Al-Jeffery [2016] EWHC 2151 (Fam)

Amina was a dual British-Saudi national who age 17 had been taken by her father from the UK to Saudi Arabia. Earlier legal proceedings on her behalf were withdrawn on her own instructions, which she later said her father had tricked her into. By 21, she applied for an order under the inherent jurisdiction herself, saying she was kept under constraint in her father’s home in Saudi Arabia and prevented from leaving the country, and that he had defied a court order requiring he allow her confidential access to the British consulate and her solicitor.

The court found she had been genuinely constrained and ill-treated to the point of being unable to function as an independent adult. It decided that the inherent jurisdiction could protect a vulnerable British national even though she had not set foot in England and Wales for years and was habitually resident in Saudi Arabia. The judge ordered her father to facilitate and fund her return home, framing the purpose not as forcing any outcome, but as creating the conditions for her to exercise her own free will. The case marks the outer geographic reach of the jurisdiction's protective power.

Re TT (injunctive relief) [2022] EWHC 2185 (Fam)

Mr TT was a 46-year-old man with a mild learning disability. He wanted to live independently and see his girlfriend, but his mother (who had cared for him his whole life) had never made the shift from caring for a child to supporting an adult, and persistently tried to control where he lived and who he saw.

A judge had previously found that the mother had controlled and sought to coerce TT throughout his life, believing only she knew what was best for him, and showed no insight when asked to reflect on her own behaviour. Because he lacked capacity to decide on residence but retained capacity to decide on contact with others, the case required both jurisdictions side by side: the Court of Protection made an injunction stopping his mother interfering with his right to live in his own home, while the inherent jurisdiction was used to stop her interfering with his contact with his girlfriend.

The case is a clear worked example of how the two jurisdictions can operate together, applying to different decisions for the same person depending on where capacity does or doesn't exist, like Re CA (below).

Wakefield Metropolitan District Council v FH and others [2024] EWHC 830 (Fam)

An 81-year-old woman with Alzheimer’s and terminal cancer, who retained capacity to make decisions about her own residence and care, had been controlled and verbally and physically abused by her husband for years. Because she had capacity, the Court of Protection had no role.

This is a case decided entirely under the inherent jurisdiction. Despite earlier injunctions, the husband’s behaviour continued, including interfering with her medication and an incident serious enough that carers had to intervene directly to protect her. At the final hearing, the wife told the judge how much she loved her husband and emphasised their long marriage, yet still found supervised contact intrusive.

The court continued injunctions preventing him from removing her from the care home or any hospital she was admitted to, and from having unsupervised contact with her. The judge had no doubt about the genuine love between the couple, illustrating a theme that runs through much of this case law: protective orders and real affection are not mutually exclusive, and the law has to act on the pattern of control regardless of the relationship’s emotional sincerity.

Re P (Vulnerable Adult: Withdrawal of Application) [2024] EWHC 1882 (Fam)

A father controlled every aspect of his family's life. He forbade his wife and their children from leaving the house unaccompanied, from working, or from claiming benefits, rationing food to £1.50 a day per family member, limiting shower time, cutting their hair himself, and requiring the children to wear covert recording devices at school.

His 20-year-old daughter was eventually moved into a care home to separate her from him. A psychiatrist found no mental disorder, but concluded her views and behaviour were a manifestation of undue influence arising from years of coercion, and warned that leaving the care placement risked her falling straight back into dependence on her father.

By the time of the final hearing, however, the local authority itself concluded that continuing to mandate the placement was disproportionate, since it had produced little real change in her understanding of what she had experienced. The case is a sobering illustration that removal alone, without parallel work addressing the underlying psychological dependency, may not be enough to break a pattern of years-long control.

Re CA (Fact Finding – Capacity – Inherent Jurisdiction – Injunctive Relief) [2024] EWCOP 64 (T3)

An older woman’s daughter held a Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA) for her mother’s property and financial affairs, as well as her health and welfare. A fact-finding hearing proved eleven separate allegations against the daughter: the daughter force-fed her mother, tipped food over her head, set up covert audio-visual monitoring of her carers, and verbally abused her.

The judge found the mother retained capacity to make or revoke the LPAs but lacked capacity in other areas, and crucially found she was subject to her daughter’s undue influence even where capacity existed, so the judge invoked the inherent jurisdiction alongside the Court of Protection to make injunctive directions restricting the daughter’s conduct, while leaving the LPAs intact. In a later judgment, the daughter was found in contempt of court for breaching those injunctions. The case shows vividly how incapacity and undue influence can coexist in the same relationship, and why assessing one without the other risks missing the full picture.